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Abstract
Urban rapid transit infrastructure have been expanding at an exploding speed 
in Mainland China. Government subsidy used to be the sole fiscal support to the transit 
development for a long time. Now the government is facing enormous burden to support the 
expansion on its own. The major problems are the shortage of construction and revenue-ex-
penditure gap in funding. Therefore, the municipalities are seeking to introduce foreign 
financing strategies to the transit funding to build a a more profitable financing platform.
Hong Kong MTR has been a popular model among mainland cities for its “Rail + 
Property” model and efficient internal management. However, under current context, it is 
really difficult to completely copy the success of Hong Kong. Therefore, the implementation 
has shown several variations. Beijing Metro adds a parallel system to the existing one, 
which are under the operation of Public-Private Partnership with Hong Kong MTR Company. 
Wuhan, while paving the avenue for “Rail + Property”, employed Finance Lease to utilize the 
existing facilities to collect construction funding, which made time for property auction and 
development adjunct to and atop of the transit line.
In analyzing the implementation process of the two cases, the thesis found out the 
strategies of implementing financing strategies in Chinese mainland cities, and illustrated the 
context and the incentives for the variations. By reviewing the case of Wuhan and Beijing, 
the thesis analyzed how the two cities made localized adaptions, their contracts in the two 
implementations, and the key part that contributed to reaching the expected effects. In finding 
a working principal from these two cases, the thesis also analyzed the problems in imple-
mentation caused by the government role, the financing platform of metro company, and the 
mechanism of implementation.
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1. Introduction
 
In the urbanization process, traffic congestion and transportation pollution are among 
the major problems for Chinese cities. Urban rapid transit infrastructure has become an 
important solution to these problems for its capacity as mass transport, high speed, less 
energy cost, low pollution, and less occupation of land. Urban Rapid transit is a type of 
high-capacity public transport generally found in urban areas, which operates on an exclusive 
right-of-way, which often grade separated tunnels or on elevated railways. The rapid transit 
system discussed in this thesis includes underground and overground railway systems, tram 
services, express lines, airlines and so on.
At the same time, mega city clusters are emerging in China. As a convenient transport 
in urban and suburban areas, the demands on the scale and the coverage of the urban rapid 
transit have been larger than anytime before. In the recent years, the transit infrastructures 
are sprawling at a faster speed than ever. From 2008 to 2015, the overall length of the transit 
lines has increased from 780 km to 1700km. 37 cities are constructing new transit lines in 
2015.
This requires not only the local authorities, but also governments in higher levels 
to build a system to support the long-term transit development. Urban rapid transit is under 
the direct management of municipal government and usually an essential part of provincial 
and national plan. The transit services has a low possibility to be privatized and marketized. 
The current rapid construction projects challenges both the funding and the management 
capability of the city. 
There are two major fiscal problems for the transit infrastructure: the shortage of 
construction funding and the absence of a stable revenue stream to support the mainte-
nance and operation of the system. For a long time, the transit infrastructure has been wholly 
relied on the government subsidy, which would add huge fiscal monetary pressure to the 
government under current development. To relieve this, the government has been trying to 
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introduce the foreign financing strategies and advanced experience to the cities. 
  
This thesis focuses on the implementation of the financing strategies in China and 
the process of localized adaptions. Specifically, Hong Kong MTR “Rail + Property” has been 
a popular example among Chinese cities. However, copying the success from Hong Kong 
has some fundamental system problems. System-wide comprehensive planning is difficult 
to accomplish after systemwide restructure of state-owned enterprises, in which the transit 
companies were dissected into separate companies to shoulder specific responsibilities, 
such as construction, operation, and development investment. Another prerequisite of “Rail 
+ Property” is the use and development rights of the land properties in the transit line areas. 
However, currently, the transit companies do not have this control. It takes time to acquire the 
land rights and prepare for land auction, listings and other development activities.
Seeing these constraints, it is important for the cities to coordinate their existing 
resources and locate the priority demand. This thesis analyzed two cases utilizing different 
strategies in adapting Hong Kong strategies. To improve the efficiency inside of the operation 
system, Beijing introduced Hong Kong MTR directly to the transit system through a Public-
Private Partnership and adds a parallel operation system to the existing one. In order to 
support future implementation of “Rail + Property”, Wuhan introduced Finance Lease to adjust 
capital structure and make time for land development adjunct to the transit lines. 
Both Beijing and Wuhan are developing the transit system at an astonishing speed. 
It is said Beijing took 50 years to reach the scale of transit coverage that took London 150 
years. As shown in the pictures below, by the year of 2020, the government of Beijing is 
planning to build 981 km transit line, almost 4 times as the length in 2008. Even though 
holding the Olympic Games offered Beijing sufficient incentives and resources to develop at 
such an astonishing velocity, how to find a efficient financing platform to support future devel-
opment is still one of biggest challenge for Beijing. 
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           Pic 1 Transit Map 2008                       Pic 2 Transit Map 2015              Pic 3 Transit Planning Map 2020
Wuhan, as the leading second-tier city in China, is also an example of exploding 
growth in transit.  Different from Beijing, in Wuhan, Line 1 started to function at the year of 
2004 and served the city as the only transit line for 8 years. After that Line 2 opened in 2012, 
Line 4 in 2013, and line 3 in 2015. 6 new lines and 4 extensions are planned to be built in 
the next 6 years. According to the released official plan of city government, over 14 transit 
projects are going to be constructed in 2016, for which the expenditure on construction is 
estimated at 126 billion Yuan. The transit line is expected to reach 400kms in 2021.By the 
year of 2049, Wuhan will have 32 metro lines, around 1200 kms in the city.
 
  
              Pic 4 Transit Map 2012                    Pic 5 Transit Map 2015  Pic 6 Transit Map 2020
The two cases shows two variations in implementing identical strategy. A public-
private partnership is a contractual arrangement between a public agency (federal, state, 
or local) and a private entity. Through this contract, the public and private sectors build the 
agreement to share their skills and assets in delivering a service or facility for the use of the 
general public. This mechanism introduced the advanced experience from Hong Kong to 
lower the operation and maintenance cost of the transit lines. 
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Finance lease is a way of providing finance – effectively a leasing company (the 
lessor or owner) buys the asset for the user (usually called the hirer or lessee) and rents 
it to them for an agreed period. Wuhan utilizes this strategy to collect sufficient funding for 
upcoming construction project.
For the transit project of this scale, it is really difficult to define it as “success” or 
“failure”. However, the study will still illustrate the workable principal in the implementation 
and finds out the strategies of implementing financing strategies. 
This thesis will utilize these two cities as case studies and thoroughly study the 
implementation process in these two cities. Through the comparison and review of previous 
experience, this thesis hopes to identify the role of government in implementing foreign 
financing strategies and provides suggestions on future directions.
First, the thesis will summarize the common financing patterns in Mainland China. 
This part also includes a briefly study of Hong Kong MTR, that provides ideas on the financing 
mechanism in general.
Second, the thesis will study the case in Beijing and Wuhan respectively. For Beijing 
case, an extensive review will be conducted on the Public-Private Partnership mechanism in 
Line 4 and the design of contract to coordinate both private interests and public benefits. In 
Wuhan case, the thesis will review the decision-making process of the financing process for 
construction funding, and the scalability across China.
Third, the thesis will identify the role of government on the basis of the comparison 
between two case studies. This part will also summarize the limitations of this study and 
come up with future directions for the development.
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2. Literature Review
This parts reviews literature that support the decision-making process for municipal 
government to identify their financing strategies in need and make coordinated adpaptions 
to work under the city context. The theoretical studies on transportation mega-projects fall 
into three general categoties: the theory of urban transportation investment, the financing 
strategies in transit infrastructure, and the theory of decision making in financing urban devel-
opment.
2.1.   Theory of Urban Transportation Investment
2.1.1.   Attributes of Urban Rapid Transit
Natural Monopoly
Natural Monopoly usually describes the industry that has high fixed costs and relatively 
low viable costs. Clarkson and Miller proved that from the perspective of economies of scale, 
natural monopoly could improve the efficiency of the resources. The natural monopoly of urban 
rapid transit comes from the effects of economies of scale and high technical requirement for 
the transit system.
Quasi-public Goods
According to Samuelson’s definition, public goods have non-rivalry and non-exclud-
ability. The service transit systems provide fits public goods, but it also exists competition and 
excludability. The passengers have to afford the tickets to take the train, which falls into the 
characteristics of private goods. Therefore, rapid transit system are quasi-public goods.
Positive Externality
On the basis of Marshall’s theory, Pigou defined negative externality and positive 
externality. Positive externality lies in the benefits that enjoyed by a third party that are not 
directly involved. Urban rapid transit systems shows the positive externality by public benefits, 
such as improving the quality of travel, relieving the congestions and pollution.
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Regionality of Business
Alonso introduced concentric land-use structure in urban model: Central Business 
District – High-density residential – Low-density residential. Rapid transit systems are limited 
in urban areas. Only dense population and economic development could dilute the huge 
construction and operation cost.
2.1.2.   Theory Base for Urban Transportation Finance
Keynesian Investment Theory
Keynesian investment theory shows that usually no strong automatic mechanism 
could produce economical output towards full employment. The primary access is to stabilize 
the economy is by efficient fiscal policies. Transit infrastructure investment has a negative 
marginal investment return ratio and lacks the incentive for private capital. Therefore, the 
fiscal policies are crucial to the supported the infrastructure projects.
Investment Theory in Public Goods
Samuelson defined the “Free Rider” issues in public goods. Because of the non-ex-
cludability public goods, people tend to be a free rider. This leads to the low investment return 
ratio and lacks the impetus for private investment. Therefore, it is difficult to meet the Pareto 
Optimal Output in the society.
The common public payment methods include: 1) users pay; 2) everybody pays; 3) 
beneficiaries pay. Currently most of the transit systems are going on the users pay way, but 
the ticket revenue could not cover the actual expenditure of the transit system. Government 
will subsidize the discrepancy to compensate the transit companies for its loss.
Theory on Urban Transportation Modes
Urban economics analyzes the transportation modes from government’s side. It is an 
ex ante cost and benefit analysis to maximize the social benefits. The demand and supply 
relationship shows that for urban dense cities, rapid transit system is the optimal transport. 
The government should maximize the social benefits and minimize the social cost for transit 
projects.
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2.2 Financing Strategies in Transit infrastructure
Cai categorized the transit investment mode generally into three categories: 1). 
government fund; 2). project finance; 3). Marketization. Based on this, Zhu and Zhang detailed 
the finance sources under Chinese context into five categories: 1). government funding, under 
direct administration of government agencies; 2). government funding, under the adminis-
tration of special state-owned enterprises; 3). government funding, under the administration of 
private companies through leasing or concession contract; 4). project financing, management 
and operation under government concession; 5. marketization, private companies under 
government concession.
Wang Y. and Wang J. studied the evolution and logistics in the development, and 
summarize the process by the level of marketization. In the monopoly of public sectors, 
through financing schemes and institutional reorganization, the government gradually open 
up the market to private sectors. The avenues to bringing up the level of marketization are 
the restructure of organization and business. The private capital are gradually introduced 
to the financing system via business restructure and de regulation. Together with institution 
restructure, a relatively complete market could be built. The chart is shown below.
 
Chart 1 Evolution of Financing Strategies
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2.3 Financing Strategy Decision Making
After studying the political and economic origins in the great transformation era, 
Polany argued that “free market” is a myth. The market has to be sustained as an entity under 
the context of the state and society. Though the study focused on the private goods, it is still 
reasonable to apply the theory to the quasi-public good, like transit system. To embrace the 
private and foreign capital into the transit system, the fiscal decision makers have to compre-
hensively consider the implementation environment and overarching goals of the financing 
and investment. Especially in China, the political and economic environment are both crucial 
to the participants in the financing and investment process.
Goulet theorizes about three rationalities governing planning and development 
decisions: political, technical, and ethical. Unitary rationality on the development plan could 
often lead to the failure. From the perspective of the government, the three rationalities do 
not work independently from each other. The inter-related relationship allows some degree 
of substitution. Therefore, the rationale for any implementation should be out of the compre-
hensive evaluation of the context and the development process. The transit system builds up 
a skeleton of the city development spatially and the enormous investment also calls for the 
coordinated fiscal policies. Apart from the fiscal problems, the development of transit system 
should actually benefit the planning process and generate public welfare.
Luo evaluated the environment for infrastructure financing and investment in China. 
Basically, the financing of transit system is to attract foreign and private capital into the infra-
structure sectors. The successful application process are decided by three key factors:  1) a 
sustainable revenue stream; 2) no institutional barriers hinder the entrance of private sectors; 
3) the capability to institutionally minimize the barriers caused by the economic and technical 
attributes of the transit system.
Diao analyzed the infrastructure investment experience from western countries 
and made suggestions to the Chinese cities. The development mode and the marketization 
largely depend on three indicators: 1) the efforts of the government; 2) the efficiency of the 
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involved private company; 3) the external environment, such as the development of domestic 
capital market. Based on Diao’s studies, the evolution and development of the financing 
model hereinbefore could also be modified in various scenarios. This flexibility creates the 
opportunity for negotiation and the problems at the same time. Clarification of the responsi-
bilities and revenues are very important in this process.
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3. Research Methods
3.1   Case studies
This thesis aims at studying the various avenues for Chinese municipal governments 
to implement financing strategies. The case studies show how the municipal governments 
make their own variations in applying identical financing mechanism and how the implemen-
tation process goes on. Two mainland Chinese cities are selected as case studies. Both 
Beijing and Wuhan are trying to copy “Rail + Property”, Beijing built Public-Private Partnership 
with Hong Kong MTR and added P3’s operation system to the existing system, while Wuhan 
built finance lease contract to make time for implementing “Rail + Property” when current 
funding was not able to support the development.
1) Beijing – Beijing Infrastructure Investment Corporation, Beijing Capital Group, 
together with Hong Kong MTR Corporation founded the Public-Private Partnership Company 
-- Beijing MTR Corporation. It is the nationwide first implementation of Public-Private-Part-
nership in public transportation. Beijing MTR Corporation runs three transit lines in a parallel 
system with Beijing Metro Company.
2) Wuhan – The municipal government of Wuhan designed long-term devel-
opment plan for “Rail + Property”. However, at that time, Wuhan was exhausting its credit 
in bank mortgage for transit funding, while the scale and location of existing transit network 
could not support ”R+P” mode. Therefore, Wuhan Metro introduced Finance Lease. Wuhan 
Metro Company signed finance lease contract with Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
Finance Lease Company for 2 billion. Wuhan is the first city to implement finance lease in 
the transit infrastructure. Yuan construction fund. The finance lease readjusted the capital 
structure has been widely used thereafter.
The Implementation of Financing Strategies in Urban Rapid Transit Infrastructure: How Could Chinese Cities Do Better? 11
3.2   Transportation data and performance evaluation data
The thesis will go through the development of transit system in Beijing and Wuhan. 
The transportation data were acquired from online open data. These data help illustrate the 
scale of development and the fiscal burden of the two cities.
The analysis of two foreign financing strategies will be based on the evaluation data of 
their performance. The data were also from the online open data, released official report, and 
news articles. Through reviewing the materials, the thesis hopes to picture the whole process 
of the implementation, how the local government revised the implementation to coordinate 
with their actual demands, and the key issues contribute to the success of the implemen-
tation. Due to the limited access to the fiscal data, some data in the analysis part are based 
on the estimation from acquired data.
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4. Financing Patterns in Hong Kong and Main-
land China
This part reviews the financing mechanism in Hong Kong MTR and the common 
financing patterns for infrastructure in Mainland China.
4.1 Financing Pattern in Hong Kong
Hong Kong MTR Corporation, a listed company, runs the only profitable transit system 
in the world. The sustainable strategic planning, marketized management, comprehensive 
land development, and integrated policy system ensures the success of Hong Kong subway. 
4.1.1   “Rail + Property”
Hong Kong introduced the TOD (Transit-Oriented Development) at the early stage 
of development. Typically, Hong Kong MTR Company is famous for its “Rail + Property” 
mode. The commerce and land property development around transit stations are the most 
successful components of Hong Kong “Rail + Property”. The revenue mainly comes from 
three aspects:
1) Commerce and property value capture
The development of transit lines brings up the real estate price along the transit lines 
and attracts population to the new development district. The growing population then lifts the 
value of the real estate again. The cyclical increase leads the continuously increase of the 
commerce and property value.
2) The commercial revenue inside of the transit station
To fully utilize the space of transit platform and underground passages, based on the 
massive ridership, MTR sets up advertising columns, LED screen, and retail stores for adver-
tising fees and shop rents.
3) Value Capture atop the station
Development atop the stations is the major revenue source for MTR “Rail + Property”. 
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Shopping plaza, office buildings, commercial centers and communities are the typical forms 
of the development. And the MTR make profits from rents and management fees.
4.1.2   Other sources 
The funding sources for Hong Kong lies in five fields.
1) Fiscal Subsidy
Hong Kong opened its first transit line in 1979 and did not reach the balance of 
investment and expenditure until 1991. In the early stage of the development, government 
funding is the major source for the transit funding. In 1996, Hong Kong government took out 
regulation that the government will compensate for 15% of the discrepancy in the revenues 
for that year.
2) Ticket revenues
One unique condition is that ticket revenue is the second largest financing resource 
for MTR. Hong Kong MTR has the autonomy over ticket price, and adjusts the price based 
on inflation rate annually. The annual ridership reached over 1.6 billion person time and the 
tickets covers 175% of the system operation costs in 2015.
3) Investment
Because of the reputation for profitable mass transit, Hong Kong MTR has been 
investing in rapid transit and exporting their functioning mechanics. The Beijing cases studied 
hereinafter is an example of Hong Kong investment, which Hong Kong invested and shared 
the operation and management techniques with Beijing MTR Corporation.
4) Other Sources
Telecommunication in transit station contributes increasingly to MTR’s funding. And 
Hong Kong MTR has been selling their expert capacity and expertise in providing consulting 
services for other areas and countries, including planning, financing, marketization, profession 
training, and so on.
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4.2 Financing Pattern in Mainland China
The financing pattern of rapid transit system could in Chinese mainland cities could 
be divided into four categories: 1) government funds and government operates; 2) the 
marketized operation under the government administration; 3) Project financing; 4) Listed 
financing platforms.
4.2.1   Government funds and operates
The government funds the projects mainly from two ways: direct investment and debt 
financing. Typically, direct investment and government operates could be seen in the earlier 
stage in Beijing and Tianjin transit systems. The development depends on the government 
subsidy to build new lines and operates the system. Government seldom provide development 
rights of land properties along the transit lines or policy supports. The sole funding source 
doesn’t generate financing cost but causes the inefficiency in the system. The government 
could not afford the mega transit system and needs to come up with incentive mechanism to 
improve operation efficiency.
Debt financing and government operates is the pattern that the government pay part 
of the investment and provide guarantee for the bank loans and debt to collect the rest of 
funding. This method is widely used for the reason that it’s easy to arrange by government 
credit and provide sufficient capital. At the same time, it brings huge debts and lows down the 
operation efficiency.
4.2.2   Private sector operates under government administration
The pattern “private operation under government administration” is that the government 
pays for the construction and attract the private sectors to the operation and management 
through leasing contracts and concession contracts. It introduced marketization impetus and 
improves the efficiency in the operation. However, due to the low revenues from the transit 
investment, the application usually goes with additional beneficiary policies to the private 
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sectors. For example. Shanghai Metro signed 10-year free contract with Shentong Metro on 
the operation of certain transit lines and facilities. Shentong Metro has to maintain the original 
ticket price for five years and adjust the price with the government after five years.
4.2.3   Project financing
Project financing is a way that uses the anticipated benefits and duties in risk 
mitigation as guarantee, the project funding as collateral and actual revenues to pay back 
the loan. Public-Private Partnership discussed in this thesis is a typical example of project 
financing. The common project financing methods include BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer), 
BTO (Build-Transfer-Own), and so on. Both the government and private companies invested 
in the project, and the share of government investment is decided by the expected Invest-
ment-Return-Ratio from the private companies. The government reviews the performance of 
the project companies and offers incentive and concession procedures.
According to the quasi-public goods of urban rapid transit, urban rapid transit infra-
structure lacks the ability to generate sufficient stable revenues. Governments subsidize the 
project and fill the funding gap by the co-founded company. Due to the differences in the 
capacities to shoulder the fiscal burden, the subsidies goes either” Subsidize in Building 
Operate and Transfer” or “Build Subsidize in Operation and Transfer”.
This method distributes the risk and benefits to various participants. It creates the 
incentive mechanism for the government and pushes the private companies to lower their 
operation cost and uplift the management level. The Beijing case hereinafter is a typical 
example for this pattern.
4.2.4   Financing platforms with diverse investment bodies
This usually could be seen through the restructure and reorganization of the existing 
state-owned enterprises. By increasing the share stock of the listed state-owned enter-
prises, to attract social capital to invest in the transit system. When introducing the market 
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competition to the company operation, it could reach the marketization under governmental 
regulation and control.
This mechanism introduces the diverse investment bodies and market competition to 
the financing system, reaching the marketization under the supervision of the government. 
However, the fundamental controversy here is the different ultimate goal between government 
and private sectors. Therefore the government has to set up certain restriction and incentive 
policy packages to ensure the success of the implementation.
Hong Kong has been the vanguard for this pattern. Hong Kong MTR Metro Corpo-
ration has been selling billions of equity to the public. And mainland Chinese cities have been 
applying this strategies in various transport elements since the 1990s.
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5. Public-Private-Partnership in Beijing
5.1 Background
5.1.1.   Development Timeline
At the year of 1953, the Chinese government issued the first official documentation 
on the development of transit system. The proposal of constructing a transit system in Beijing 
is to transport soldiers for the consideration of national defense. The utility of social benefits 
was not the deciding factor in the planning process.
Line 1 started transport services in 1969. Not until 1981 did the subway open to the 
public. Then within 12 yeas, the daily passenger flow reached 1million. Winning the bid of 
the Olympics Games was the starting point of speed up transit infrastructure development. 
Daily passenger flow of Beijing subway reached 10 million at the year of 2013 and has been 
continuing to grow, greatly exceed the capacity of the existing system. 
       
5.1.2. Pricing system
According to 2013 Fiscal Report of Beijing, public transportation ranked No.4 in the 
annual governmental expenditure, higher than the social services and medical services. It 
accounted for 5.48% of the total expenditure. And the numbers in Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen were 2.08%, 1.28%, and 1.2% respectively.
Uniform Pricing System had been one major feature of Beijing Transit System. From 
1969 to 2014, Beijing had always been utilizing the uniformed price for both rapid transit and 
bus services. On December 28, 2014, government of Beijing broke the old rule and imple-
mented the laddering pricing system in the public transportation system that based on the 
travel distance of each rider. The government expected the price reform in 2014 would be 
the leverage to relieve congestion, transform travel behaviors and relieve the fiscal burden 
on the subsidy.
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There haven’t been sufficient data shows the change of ridership or ticket revenues 
in response to the price change. However, Beijing experienced twice price increases at the 
same scale in 1996 and 2000. Both of the two changes significantly reduced the ridership in 
that year. However, in both of the two cases, the ridership went back to the original growth 
after 1-2 years.
5.1.3.   Implementation of Public-Private Partnership
In the year of 2004, to better serve 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the government 
of Beijing held an investment promotion conference on transit infrastructure for the very first 
time. Line 4 was chosen to be the pilot project in the countrywide to apply Public-Private-Part-
nership model in transportation infrastructure. Proposals of founding a P3 corporation--Beijing 
MTR Corporation by Beijing Infrastructure Investment Corporation, Beijing Capital Group and 
Beijing and Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway Corporation won the bid for a 30-year contract 
to Line 4. 
Beijing MTR Corporation were anticipated to save Beijing 100 million RMB in trans-
portation funding in 30-year contract. The excellent operation performance and effective 
management mechanism of Line 4 later helped Beijing MTR Corporation in winning the bid 
of Line 14 and 16.
5.2 Public-Private Partnership Application in Line 4
5.2.1    Institutional Context of Beijing Transit system
Beijing Metro Corporation was originally in charge of all the transit projects in Beijing. 
In the year of 2001, it was dissected into Beijing Metro Construction Administration Corpo-
ration, Beijing Metro Operation Co., Ltd and Beijing Infrastructure Investment Corporation to 
separate the services of construction, operation and investment represent the government in 
the three functions respectively.
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As mentioned hereinbefore, Beijing Capital Group and Hong Kong MTR (Mass Transit 
Railway) Corporation were introduced to the system through the PPP contract. Together with 
Beijing Infrastructure Investment Corporation, they founded Beijing MTR Corporation. 
Therefore, there are two independent institutional fabrics currently working in Beijing 
transit. Beijing MTR Corporation manages the Line 4,14,16, while Beijing Metro Operation Co., 
Ltd was in charge of operation and maintenance of the rest lines. The institutional structure 
of Beijing is shown in the picture below. According to the contract, Beijing MTR shares the 
revenues with Beijing Metro Operation on the basis of the passengers’ traveling distance in 
their own lines.
 
Chart 2 Institutional Context of Beijing Transit
5.2.2    Public-Private Partnership Contract
Line 4 is a countrywide pilot project for PPP application in transportation infrastructure. 
And it was the first time for Beijing to introduce private investment in mega-infrastructure. The 
design of the contract has two overarching goals: 
1) Ensure the stability of the contracted company and the quality of services;
2) Prevent the possibility of exorbitant profit from growing ridership and price 
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increase.
In the contract, PPP company-- Beijing MTR Corporation has the concessionary 
development rights of Line 4. When the contract expires, The P3 Company will transfer the 
whole property it owns back to Beijing Infrastructure Investment Corporation unrequitedly 
after the contract expires.
5.2.3   Institutional Settings
The contract divided the project into two phases and two properties. Phase 1 is 
4-year construction period of the rail with the cost of 10.7 billion yuan, which was invested 
by BIIC branch company Line 4 Investment Company and constructed by Beijing MTR 
Construction Administration Corporation. PPP Company took the responsibility of Phase 2 – 
the investment of electromechanical facilities and subway vehicles for 4.6 billion yuan, and a 
30-year integrated management of the whole line.
 
Chart 3 Institutional Organization of Line 4
BIIC, BCG and MTR hold 2%, 49% and 49% respectively of the stock of Beijing MTR 
Corporation. The check and balance of the institutional settings shows in two aspects:
1) Participants 
BIIC, a state-owned-enterprise, is the intermediary and platform of transit investment 
and funding that receives the subsidies from the government and distributes them in the 
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transit system. BCG is a state-owned-enterprise that has abundant experience in real estate 
investment and investment banking. Hong Kong MTR Corporation is the most successful 
transit corporation in the world, which functions the only profitable transit system all over the 
world— Hong Kong Subway system. Hong Kong MTR is famous for its “Retail + Property” 
and has successfully applied their models in several countries.
Involving the governmental investors and successful private practitioner introduces 
the advanced experience and ensures the supervisions from government. 
2) Stock share
The distribution of 2%, 49% and 49% smartly meets the foreign investment standard 
and economically offers decision-making rights to BIIC.
The company has 5 directors in the board of directors, 2 from BCG, 2 from Hong 
Kong MTR and 1 from BIIC. This setting provides BIIC the deciding vote in decision-making 
process.
The government of Beijing entitled the rights in Phase B to Beijing MTR Corporation 
through a concessionary agreement (te xu xie yi) and only oversees the functioning of Beijing 
MTR Corporation, which leaves sufficient room for PPP company to apply their development 
strategies without government interventions.
5.2.4   Risk Governance and Mitigation
One of the well-recognized design of Line 4 PPP application is its comprehensive and 
coordinated contract in risk mitigation, for public services, public sectors and private sectors.
1) Public Service Risk Mitigation
PPP contract is an implementation of long-term profit gain from public sector asset. 
What worth mentioning is that Beijing MTR Corporation runs a separate charging system 
and monitoring system from other lines. Under this mechanism, the major challenges for the 
application are:
a) Unqualified services. (For example, the P3 contract has a specific clause on 
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the punctuality rate. If the performance of Line 4 doesn’t meet the contracted rate, it will be 
regarded as “Unqualified services”.)
b) Increased ticket price 
If either of two scenarios appears, it would decrease the user experience in the transit 
infrastructure and exclude poorer user groups from equitable accesses to the public services.
Therefore, the government sets detailed standards of service level, quality, ticket 
price, and safety guarantee. Once any of the terms were not qualified, government will 
intervene the functioning of the transit line until it meets the standard.
2) Public Sector Risk Mitigation
The sprawl of transit lines and growing population in Beijing provide a huge potential 
user pool for Line 4. This captures the attention of the government in the mitigation of excessive 
profits from public services.
A scope of anticipated ridership/daily passenger flow by the estimation of professional 
consulting firm is set in the contract. When the ridership exceeds the ceiling, the majority of 
excessive revenues will be transferred to the government. No specific share of the excessive 
revenues is set; the figure will dynamically depend on the overall functioning of the transit 
system in that year.
3) Private Sector Risk Mitigation
The private sectors have the risk of the sustained losses from ticket revenues, cost 
management, and unanticipated external factors. Five strategies were set to mitigate the risk 
for private sectors—Hong Kong Metro Corporation.
a) Split the investment to improve mercantile rate of return
The investment of Line 4 is split into two parts (shown as Property A and Property 
B in Pic 7). The government investment company invests construction projects that require 
larger amount of investment. This part of investment is regarded as genuine profitless public 
expenditure.
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PPP company shoulders only the responsibility of the facility investment that is able to 
generate stable revenue stream return through effective management. Minimized investment 
share incentives the private capital and relieve its investment burden.
b) Special Project Loans for PPP company
Special Project Loans from National Development Bank are issued to Beijing MTR 
Corporation, which infill adequate cash flow to the company and improve the mercantile rate 
of return for its shareholders.
c) Sufficient government subsidy to maintain low fare
Line 4 has the uniformed price as other lines in Beijing. To compensate private 
interests, the government identifies the scope of costs and estimates the actual ticket fare of 
each year based on the listed costs. The municipality will subsidize the gap between nominal 
fare and the actual fare every year.
d) Dynamic leasing fare to balance the revenue
As shown in Pic 7, Beijing MTR Corporation rents Property A from Beijing Line 4 
Investment Company through a lease contract. The lease fee varies with the actual ridership 
of that year, which increases with the ridership growth and decrease with less ridership. 
e) Advanced buy-back trigger Mechanism
This mechanism is designed to ensure the investment safety of the private sectors. 
According to the concessionary agreement, in the period of the public-private partnership 
contract, once the annual ridership touches the floor of the ridership scope mentioned herein-
before successively at the first 3 years, government of Beijing will advance the timing to buy 
back the Property B at the market price and end the contract. The PPP company will only 
bear the loss in the three years and be able to escape from the contract without penalties. 
This clause targets at the extreme scenarios, and shows flexibility in protecting the safety of 
private capital.
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5.2.5    Performance 
5.2.5.1   Government Incentives
The major cause for enormous fiscal burden on the government is the revenue-ex-
penditure gap. In 2013, the operation cost is 8.56 Yuan/person-time; the revenue is 1.87 
Yuan/person-time. According on the average traveling distance of each ride —15 km, this 
means the government had to subsidize 0.446 Yuan for every kilometer a passenger had 
traveled. 
Both BIIC and Beijing Metro Operation Co., Ltd are ‘brother’ state-owned enterprises. 
This makes BIIC lack of the capacity to intervene and reform the operation of Beijing Metro 
Operation Co., Ltd through fiscal leverage. Besides, there is no efficiency model that could be 
used as reference for Beijing Metro operation Co. Ltd. inside of the transit system or external 
incentives to improve its efficiency. The monopoly status and opaque fiscal structure also 
breeds corruption and resource waste, which even worsens fiscal condition.
The government expects to reach the following goals through the PPP applications:
1) Relieve the burden on fiscal subsidy and resource allocation,
2) Bring positive competition in the transit system,
3) Improve the level of management of transit line,
4) Transform the role of government from ‘parent’ to ‘supervisor’,
5) Introduce market mechanism and keep the government from enterprise 
management
5.2.5.2 Beijing MTR Corporation Performance
Based on the estimations from Beijing MTR Corporations, under the MTR mechanism, 
the total government fiscal expenditure of Line 4 is around 50 billion Yuan, compared with 
60 billion Yuan under traditional mechanism. The government claimed the implementation 
decreased fiscal expenditure by 10 billion RMB.
As mentioned hereinbefore, Hong Kong Mass Transit Rail generates largest component 
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of its revenues from its ‘Property + Retail’ model. In the case of Line 4, the government only 
offers very limited development rights of the transit corridors for Beijing MTR. If single out the 
farebox recovery, the ratio Line 4 in 2011 is 52%, under the condition of uniform two yuan 
ticket. Though the laddering price system is expected to improve this ratio, under the time of 
uniform pricing system, the advantages of MTR management is not significant.
However, Beijing Government official transportation report claims that apart from the 
land revenues, the average annual revenues from Line 4 are still much higher than other transit 
lines. After reviewing the mechanism of two transit operation companies, the sustainable 
revenues come from three aspects:
1) Effective cost control and management 
As a listed company, Beijing MTR Corporation has a more transparent cost 
management mechanism under the inspection of stockholders. This mechanism pushes the 
corporation to keep detailed track of expenditure items and effectively prevent corruptions.
Beijing MTR Corporation also has a lively asset management system that integrates 
the depreciations in fixed facilities into every project. In this way is MTR Corporation able to 
better control the costs in the existing and future projects.
2) More revenues than anticipated from rapidly growing ridership
The estimated daily passenger flow is 0.71 million person-time by 2010, 0.82 
person-time by 2015, and 0.99 million person-time by 2034. In fact, the highest daily ridership 
has already reached 0.996 million person-time on 2010. In 2012, the ridership in Line 4 even 
exceeded that of Line 2. There is no evidence showing a direct relationship in the service 
quality and the ridership. However, the larger-than-anticipated ridership provided user pool 
that enlarges the revenue base of Line 4.
3) More revenues from advertisement and other development inside the transit 
station
According to the reports on transit incomes, Line 4 outstands in the property devel-
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opment in the stations, such as the advertisements revenues.
5.3 Analysis
5.3.1    Takeaway from Beijing implementation
Although there is no standardized definition of success, Beijing PPP implementation 
has become a classic example because of its coordinated contract design and integrated 
institutional Structure.
1) Coordinated contract design
The design of PPP contract shows both private sectors and the government have 
a clear understanding of the cost, benefits, and risks in transit system. Economic status, 
political structure and demographic characteristics are integrated in the design to make it a 
win-win contract.
The application should be profitable but not excessively profitable. Creative ways like 
identification of flow scope could be a good inspiration in other implementations.
Integrated institutional structure
State-owned-enterprise at a larger stock share is a deciding feature of the PPP case. 
The capacity of municipal government to embrace private investment in public services largely 
depends on the extent to which the concessionary company (PPP company) is able to fit in 
the local context. The cooperation of local infrastructure financing platform and experienced 
private company is an applicable direction for more future projects.
5.4 Future Development
1) Deepen the system reform in Beijing transit
Seeing the comparisons between Beijing Metro Operation Co., Ltd and Beijing Metro 
Corporation, simply applying a new financing model will not fundamentally improve the 
situation. Due to the complexity of the project, one limitation of this paper is lack of a broader 
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view of the management problems in the transit system. To build a more profitable financing 
platform for transit development, the city has to comprehensively collaborate planning on 
construction, operation, and investment as a whole and work with land property development. 
Prior to this process, how to draw the boundary between government and private entities, 
how to build independent state-owned transit rails and how the government should deliver 
their supervision are the questions need to be solved before moving forward.
2) Mixed PPP Delivery 
In the mixed PPP cases, the private investors are a shareholder of the transit 
companies that not only runs the management system, but also the financial investors, 
construction contractors, land developer, facility providers and so on. The Line 16 project by 
Beijing MTR Corporation introduce the equity financing into the existing PPP mechanism, 
upgrade the financing strategy to “equity financing + concessionary operation” model, which 
are also two applicable improvements for future implementation projects.
In a nutshell, Line 4 project in Beijing is more than a trial of PPP in public transit. 
It is a project that defines new transportation narrative and incentive to open up the mind 
for innovative financing strategies. The experience and implementation strategies are an 
example for PPP project delivery in in infrastructure and public services.
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6. Finance Lease in Wuhan
6.1. Development Context
The metro ticket in Wuhan is laddered by distance, 2 Yuan for travel below 9kms, 3 
Yuan for 9-14 kms, then 1 Yuan for 2 more km until the ceiling of 6 Yuan is reached. In 2014, 
the daily passenger flow within 9 km is 0.51 million, counting for 53.19%, between 9-14 km is 
0.29 million, 22%. Therefore, over 70% of the passengers are traveling and commuting at a 
relatively short distance (ticket price below 3 Yuan). The real average cost of each trip is 2.45 
Yuan. However, the actual average ticket price is 2.25 Yuan. The city government claims to 
pay the 0.25 Yuan difference for every trip.
As mentioned in hereinbefore, Line 1 was the one and only working transit lines in 
Wuhan for over eight years. Before the finance lease contract, the government of Wuhan 
had signed 21.9 billion Yuan loans in 3 contracts with National Development Bank and state-
owned commercial banks. However, these loans were still not able to cover the 27.3 billion 
Yuan budget for the three transit construction projects in 2009. The reasons for Wuhan to 
utilize to finance lease strategy as the “solution” includes:
1) the city had already reached the ceiling of the loan; 
2) to “use time to get space”, make time for land property auction and lease.
What worth mentioning is that in Wuhan case, the implementation of finance lease 
targeted at relieving the current fiscal burden for the proposed projects and expanding the 
capital base for future investment. Different from Beijing, this strategy does not generate 
revenues in the operation phase of the transit system.
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6.2 Funding resources
The overarching goal of the financing system in Wuhan Metro is to accommodate 
sufficient funding for development while ensuring the quality of the service. There are seven 
major funding sources for Wuhan Metro funding, including:
1) Special transit construction fund from municipal budget, mainly from land leasing 
fees from city-owned land, city maintenance and construction tax, and urban infrastructure 
facility support expense
2) Land leasing revenues from land properties atop and adjunct to the transit lines;
3) Special fund for key enterprise development;
4) Subsidy for transit operation;
5) Special appropriation from federal and provincial subsidy;
6) Municipal transit bonds
7) Funding from other sources, such as telecommunication system lease, metro card, 
advertisement, and real estates.       
As mentioned hereinbefore, Wuhan has been employing the laddering pricing system. 
To validate the feasibility of uplifting the farebox recovery ratio, Wuhan held several public 
hearings on higher ticket price. It turned out that the transit expenses accounts 4.44% of the 
annual incomes, which has already been reached the intermediate level in China. Uplifting 
the current ticket price is not a good solution for the city.
Fiscal budget on transportation development of Wuhan is lower than that of Beijing. 
The appropriation from federal and provincial subsidy is limited at approximately 40% of the 
total costs. Local government is pushed to bake the rest 60% cake on their own. However, on 
the one hand, all the municipal sources involve complex and time-consuming application and 
evaluation procedures. On the other hand, government credits become the major collateral 
in all the resource mobilization activities. To facilitate the timely allocation of the resources 
and better utilize the limited governmental credits, the city government of Wuhan introduced 
Finance Lease strategy in 2008. It is also the countrywide first implementation of the strategy 
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in financing the urban rapid transit infrastructure.
6.3 Finance Lease
6.3.1.   Mechanism and Contract
Finance lease is a way of providing finance – effectively a leasing company (the 
lessor or owner) buys the asset for the user (usually called the hirer or lessee) and rents it to 
them for an agreed period.
In November 2008, Wuhan Metro Company signed the 15-year finance lease contract 
with Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Finance Lease Company. According to the 
contract, Wuhan Metro Company sold Line 1 key facilities and vehicles to ICBC Finance 
Lease Company, in return for the eligibility to rent these properties from ICBC Finance Lease 
Company and to withdraw 2 billion Yuan from Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in 
3 years regarding of actual demands on funding for new facility purchase and construction. 
During the contract period, ICBC Finance Lease Company only holds the nominal 
ownership of the leased properties, and could not intervene the operation of the metro lines. 
When the contract expires, after Wuhan Metro Company pays up the rents and the residual 
values of the properties, Wuhan Metro Company would be able to reacquire the ownership. 
 
 
Chart 4 Finance Lease Contract Structure
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What makes finance lease case very unique is that it is not building up a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) as other financing strategies did, but a solution to adjust financing 
structure. It has been utilized several times by the government of Wuhan thereafter. The 
original plan of the government of Wuhan is to implement “Rail + Property” in Hong Kong, 
which were suspended by the absence of land ownership and suitable environment. In 
implementing process of Finance Lease, “Rail +  Property” is still the ultimate goal of transit 
financing platforms for Wuhan and the city has been putting much effort in realizing this 
strategy since then.
 
Finance lease usually is realized in three forms: sale and leaseback, direct lease, and 
sublease. The 2008 Wuhan metro contract is contains two parts: the sale and leaseback for 
the equipment and direct lease for the new facility purchase and construction. ICBC Finance 
Lease Company pays up the 2 billion yuan at one time for construction and pay the purchase 
of facilities in the future.
Based on the previous studies, the implementation of finance lease is a reasonable 
choice for the municipal government of Wuhan for the following reasons: 
1) Utilize the existing fixed assets and protect the safety of state-owned properties. In 
the finance lease of transit construction, though the lessor (ICBC Finance Lease Company) 
holds the ownership of the infrastructure facilities, all the relative risks and revenues have 
been transferred to the lessee (Wuhan Metro Company).  The lessee holds the property and 
has the priority to buy back the leased facilities. On the one hand, it maximized the value of 
existing facilities. On the other hand, this mechanism prevents loss in state-owned assets 
from the lease contract. And the special characteristics of transit property and public welfare 
ensure the safety of the leased property to the end of the contract.
2) Increase the capital base for the metro investment and avoid added-value tax 
and business tax. The interest rate for lease is at the average level of bank loan in China. 
However, the finance lease still holds several advantages in investment capital base and tax 
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avoidance.
a)  The funding from Finance Lease is listed among the source for the capital base 
of infrastructure projects. According to National Development and Reform Committee, the 
capital base for infrastructure project has to exceed a certain percentage of the total funding, 
in which the bank mortgage is not counted in the capital base. Therefore, finance lease 
actually brings flexibility in other funding sources by finishing the quota.
b) The funding from Finance lease has more freedom in the allocation. As the 
national government are strengthening the intervention and supervision of credit delivery, 
construction loans are limited to use only in the payment of specific construction projects. 
Seeing at the amount of loans in Wuhan, the municipal government has to go through bank 
entrusted payment and complex procedures. Without these kinds of constraints, finance lease 
offers the opportunity to the lessee to acquire the payment in full and distribute the funding on 
actual demands.
c) The funding from finance lease is not counted in the calculation for added-value 
tax and business tax. While the taxation of bank loan covers the full values of the loan, in the 
taxation of finance lease, the principal is excluded from the value of sales in both added-value 
tax and business tax. 
d) Finance lease creates time value of the funding from speed-up depreciation. 
The property from finance lease is able to conduct speed-up depreciation, which distribute 
the general taxation into a longer term. This creates time value for the part of funding that is 
supposed to pay for the general taxation.
e) Finance lease also has flexibility in the payment method. Even though not 
shown in Wuhan case, finance lease has several payment structure that could be tailored to 
the metro company, including step-up, step-down, rent holidays and so on.
3) Shorter period in the application. Finance lease contract has simpler application 
and approval procedures, which scores higher efficiency. Finance lease company designs its 
own evaluation system that have fewer procedures. In case of the situation where the overall 
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financing environment get worse or an urgent call for additional fund, finance lease would 
better satisfy the demands of Wuhan Metro Company than bank loans.
6.3.2 Government Incentives
Apart from the advantages hereinbefore, finance lease mechanism also incentives 
municipal government in the following aspects:
1) Protect the government from exhausting its credit. 
The happening of finance lease in Wuhan is supported by the government guarantee. 
The municipality of Wuhan issued a Letter of Guarantee to ICBC Finance Lease Company for 
the contract. This Letter of Guarantee did not influence the credit history of the government. 
Prior to the contract, the government has utilized its credit for over 20 billion yuan in syndi-
cated loan and land development loans. If turning the same amount of finance lease to bank 
loan, it would exhaust the credit and financial capability of the government for future capital 
programs.
2) Adjust the existing capital structure.
Finance lease enlarges the capital base of the transit investment and generates 
the liquidity of the funding. In Wuhan’s case, this liquidity relieves the fiscal burden of the 
government and reorganizes the capital structure, especially in revising the long-term debt 
rate to a more bearable one.
6.4 Risk Governance and Mitigation
There are very few details of the leased contract released, which makes measuring 
the risks inside the contract really difficult. This part will approach the measurement from a 
more general perspective and discuss the deciding factors in minimizing the risks for three 
parties in this contract.
Finance lease was introduced to China in the late 1980s. Though the strategy 
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widely spread in various fields, the legislation and regulations on finance lease have not 
been updated with the development. For mega infrastructure and immovable properties, the 
government and finance lease companies haven’t come up with a system that adapts the 
foreign strategies in Chinese mainland cities and protects all the participants. By reviewing 
the basics in the contract process of Wuhan, this thesis hopes to identify some principal 
indicators for major risks.
1) The project supported by the contract. 
The lease contract is suitable for the projects that could generate stable cash flow 
in a long period, such as highways, waste management facilities. And it is not suitable for 
the ones that only relies on the government subsidies, such as government office buildings, 
affordable housings. 
Transit system generates stable cash flow but is yet not profitable. By the time of the 
implementation in 2008, the city of Wuhan hasn’t built up a working local financing platform 
for Wuhan Metro. According to the officers in ICBC Finance Lease Company, what supports 
their will to facilitate this cooperation is the decisive role of transportation in urban devel-
opment and the long-time relationship with the city government of Wuhan.
2) Policy risk.  
Since 2009, the Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, and National Development and 
Reform Commission have released several Notice (tongzhi) in supervising the illegal contract 
in finance lease and Suggestions (yijian) on the risk measurement of local financing platforms. 
Currently, it requires advanced evaluation and communications with the government before 
involving in municipal infrastructure projects. So far there hasn’t been cases in the default or 
policy changes that could be utilized as a reference in transit sector. In the previous cases for 
wastewater management infrastructure, the companies confronts the problems to suffer from 
defaults and have to seek legal help to get the contracted payment.
3) The credit history of the municipal government and the operation of the local 
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finance platform.  
Before the implementation of finance lease credit, it is important to check the credit 
history of the government and whether the local financing platform is aligned with the national 
and regional development plan. Surprisingly, ICBC Finance Lease Company did not request 
any credit rating before the finance lease project.  The essence of transportation could not 
be the universal key for exception. The policy modifications and economic fluctuation still 
cultivates the possibility for the government to breach the contract, whose example could be 
found in the previous cases in water management facilities.  
6.5 Development of financing platform after Finance Lease
As mentioned hereinbefore, to make time for land property auction is one of the 
major considerations in finance lease. As a result, the 15-year contract bought Wuhan time 
to accommodate the proposed development and several strategies have been applied in the 
financing platform.
The obstacles for “Rail + Property” in 2008 was that Line 1 mainly pass through the 
old residential areas. The redevelopment of commercial areas did not catch the pace of 
the transit development then. Since 2009, Metro Line 1 has bred several major commercial 
development districts. By the time of 2015, five working transit lines has built a small-scale 
transit network and creates the location-based values for the land properties.
In 2014, Wuhan Metro Company and Wuhan Real Estate Group set up co-found 
company for land property development alongside the transit lines.  In 2015, the first transit-ori-
ented residential community opened to the public. The first retail center atop the subway 
station is planning to open in 2016.
The implementation of “Retail + Property” in Wuhan is not the focus of this thesis. 
With the implementation of Finance Lease as a buffer, it turned out that the land properties 
were developed in a more sustainable manner than easily implemented in 2008. Besides, 
“Build - Transfer” were introduced to Wuhan Metro in Line 8 for the first time.
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6.6 Scalability
Government subsidy plus bank loan usually suffice to meet the financial require-
ments at the initial stage of transit construction and to build a small scale of transit network. 
However, as with the expansion of transit lines, finance lease have several advantages 
over traditional structures. These advantages could solve some universal problems among 
Chinese mainland cities.
1) Relieve the fiscal burden of the government. 
One of the critical functions for finance lease is that it relieves the pressure of the 
government to collect a huge amount of funding in a short time. And the mechanism distributes 
the payment into a longer period, usually longer than that of bank loans. The time value and 
other fiscal benefits have elaborated hereinbefore.
2) Avoid the time-consuming procedures. 
Due to the starting stage of finance lease in China, it has a relatively loose adminis-
tration environment. The short period of application is one significant advantage of finance 
lease. Neither fiscal subsidy from government nor bank loan could effect in the urgent case. 
For the cities do not have a completed financing platform, the difficulties in getting sufficient 
loans also slows the investment in transit development.
3) Make the maximized profit from fixed assets.
The accomplished in transit construction normally do not generate any further cash 
flow. Finance lease trades the fixed assets from previous investment to function as the leased 
property to infill new capital to the funding pool and creates time value from the speed-up 
depreciation of the facilities.
In 2010, the government of Wuhan signed a 3 billion Yuan sale and leaseback contract 
with the union body of ICBC Finance Lease Company, Bohai Lease, and China Merchants 
Bank Finance Lease Company, which leased the facilities of Line 1 and Line 2.
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The success in Wuhan encourages other cities to implement this strategy. For 
example, Beijing Metro leased the vehicles for 3 billion Yuan; Tianjin leased the railway facil-
ities for 4.6 billion Yuan; Shenyang signed the lease contract for 4 billion Yuan for railway 
properties; Zhengzhou contracted for 2 billion Yuan on railway properties.
6.7 Recommendations
Finance lease provides a different perspective for transit financing. Instead of creating 
a new special purpose vehicle, this strategy prepares the existing capital structure for future 
capital projects. To comprehensively take advantage of the finance lease in urban rapid transit 
development, three recommendations are listed below.
Develop the legislation system for finance lease services.  
Based on the research so far, it turn out that there hasn’t been a legal system for 
financing lease in infrastructure as a whole. From experience in other financing strategies, 
various problems will appear as the development process going on. The legislations are 
still lack of specific clauses on the fundamental issues, such as the ownership transfer, risk 
and responsibility sharing. Developing and completing the legislation system would better 
regulate the services and the investment.
Public education on finance lease. 
Compared with finance lease services in the other transportation industry, the appli-
cations in urban rapid transit are at a very small amount. More education and popularization 
of finance lease among the consultant, officers in transit investment could provide an access 
to a more comprehensive and precise understanding of finance lease.
Open up the financing resources. 
The finance lease is usually the affiliation of state-owned bank. To expand financing 
access, the company could bring private sectors in the contracts. The foreign investment is 
also a potential source for the government to reach out to.
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7. Summary
7.1 Findings
Wuhan and Beijing directs two different paths in the transit investment. As mentioned 
hereinbefore, P3 is a parallel operation system, while finance lease is a temporary solution 
on the way for a more sustainable financing platform. The innovative applications in two cities 
illustrate the following important issues for the followers.
7.1.1. The role of government
Urban rapid transit, as quasi-public goods, is under the direct administration of 
local and national government and will not be fully privatized or marketized. In the P3 case, 
the government becomes a supervisor that oversees and regulates the P3 Company. In 
finance lease case, the government utilized its absolute credit to facilitate the contract. While 
embracing the new strategies, the government hopes to take the opportunity to revise its 
functions in the transit system, in which yet have some stubborn problems caused by its role.
1) Leading investment body
Government remains the leading investment body in the construction and mainte-
nance part. In the case studies, both the two cities rely on the fiscal subsidy to balance 
their expenditure and revenue. Even though the government has been working as the sole 
investment body in transit funding for a long time, to support the contemporary development, 
the governments at various levels are trying to infill more diverse capital in the system. 
However, the government still remains the immovable predominant status in financial 
decision-making process. The implementation of project finance hasn’t utilized the marketi-
zation to fully incentive the local finance platform, thus the government still has to shoulder 
the responsibility for most of the development process.
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2) Participant and Regulator
Government is not only a crucial actor in the financing process, but also the regulator 
in the whole transportation system. In the two case studies, the metro companies are either 
government-fund state-owned enterprise or co-found enterprise with foreign company. 
This ambiguity in participating role generates conflicts in the decision-making process. The 
government, who has the absolute power over the system, is a participant that shares the 
responsibilities and revenues in the system. The standing point of the policy lies in a gray 
zone. Which will be more important, the order of the system, or the economic benefits from 
the implementation? 
Apart from the one mentioned before, another problem is that the government are 
also expecting the transit to be a symbol of upgraded city image and international city status. 
The government are willing to push the projects that could build up a stunning appearance 
without facilitating the evolution to a more sustainable and profitable financing system at all.
As a result, the responsibilities and rights in investment and maintenance were 
difficult to clarify. The transit companies have a heavy dependence on the local environment 
and suffer from the loss from low operation efficiency. Though lacking of material on the 
governmental administration, reports and news show that local government has undertaken 
relatively frequent administrative interventions in the metro company. This kind of interven-
tions does not have a clear boundary. In this way will the project finance company not be able 
to fully adapt its advanced experience or upgrade the financial structure.
7.1.2.    The development of Metro Company
As the key state-owned enterprises, the metro companies are under the overpro-
tection of governmental subsidy. As a result, they usually have loose management and 
operation system. Seeing the performance of MTR Corporation, transit companies have the 
potential to decrease their fiscal discrepancy by improving internal efficiency. One major task 
for the municipal government is to find an incentive for the worry-free transit company to 
change from the very inside.
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The ultimate goal for transit infrastructure financing is to turn the development in 
financing strategy to better service and more accessibility to the public. System-wide 
improvement in efficiency and resource usage could mobilize the capital to the new construction 
projects and in building a more friendly experience in the transit system.
Another key fact is that nearly all the metro companies are anticipating the land 
properties to be the main revenue sources. However, the traditional metro companies 
haven’t planned to adjust its existing financial structure in response to the transit-oriented 
development. The Wuhan case shows that the government could be trapped in its financial 
structure. Thus, how to transform the existing structure with the overall transit development 
should be an urgent next step for the government.
7.1.3.    The mechanism of financing strategy and implementation
The case studies in this thesis show a broad variation of financing strategy implemen-
tation. The application lies in not only copying the whole project, but also the variations that 
take advantages of certain parts of the financing strategy to build the paths to its long-term 
financing goal. It is important that the implementation fits in the development stage of transit 
system. The government and metro company should identify their most urgent demand and 
find the solutions for the specific problem. 
The research in this thesis also shows that the contract design is a deciding issue in 
making a successful implementation. The main issues from Beijing and Wuhan are listed as 
below.
1) Revenue and responsibility sharing
The contracted agreement renders the revenues and responsibilities distributed 
reasonably among all the participants. The standing points of each sector in the contract 
may vary case by case, but the design in sharing the cost and loss have to be attractive to 
infill new capital, or compensated by subsidiary fiscal policies or concessionary benefits to 
incentive the private sectors.
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2) Risk mitigation
The contract needs to thoroughly estimate the risk of not only the public and private 
sectors as the stakeholders, but also public service packages as the ultimate deliverables of 
financing strategies. The core mitigation work in the contract is to maintain and upgrade the 
quality of the service and ensure the fruits from innovative financing strategies could benefit 
the public. At the time, it is essential to protect the safety of the infrastructure. In lease or 
collateral contract, the safety of the assets is crucial.
3) Integrated financing system
The current local finance platform for transit infrastructure focuses on the function-
ality as an intermediary and investor in land properties. The pilot implementations are also 
indicating a more diverse and integrated financing system that consists of the profiles of the 
strategies and the long-term financing plan. Especially in the case of Wuhan, it would be 
more organized and systematic in preparing for “Rail + Property” if the implementation of 
finance lease were better connected the ultimate development concept.
7.2 Limitations
All the data and information used in this thesis were obtained from open data, from 
which a lot of details were not released or accessible by public avenues. Especially in Wuhan 
Metro case, the limited information on the finance lease contract restrains the depth of 
analysis. A comprehensive risk measurement based on actual clauses could better portray 
the whole implementation process more precisely.
In order to concentrate on the analysis of specific financing strategy, this thesis did not 
analyze the other major funding sources, which includes land property revenues and short-term 
municipal bonds on transit infrastructure. These two are major incomes for the transportation 
department and also fundamental components in the capital structure of financing platform. 
According to the research, fewer information or official reports were released regarding real 
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estate revenues and municipal bonds. One potential future direction is to dig into the housing 
price after the major transit-oriented development district were established.
Both Beijing and Wuhan cases are the trial implementation of foreign financing strat-
egies in China. The two cities designed coordinated modifications to facilitate the financing 
process. The cities afterwards also revise the Beijing and Wuhan experience. It would be 
interesting to study the takeaways and improvements of these cities from second-hand imple-
mentations.
7.3 Conclusion
Recommendations for each implementation have been listed in the sections herein-
before. The study shows the flexibility and variations in the way to applying identical financing 
strategy. On the basis of the local demand, the government needs to coordinate with its 
priority and adapt the implementation to the environment.
The government is still the leading investment body in this process and the multi-di-
mensional role renders it both participants and regulator in the decision-making. This gray 
zone also slows down the efficiency of state-owned metro companies. How could the city 
better develop the metro company, and the financing platform of massive transit are the 
challenges for the government to deepen the reform.
The overarching goal of implementing financing strategies is to turn the financing 
gains to a more profitable metro company and better service to serve the public. The agree-
ment-based implementation must coordinate with the public and private sectors, and the 
specific demands on transit. The distribution of revenues and responsibilities, risks is the key 
to a successful implementation. The design of the contract should include stakeholders and 
public services together.
To better change the financing implementation into the public benefit, the government 
should align the development of financing platform with the comprehensive transit planning. 
Promoting the financial development has to be accomplished with the overall transit devel-
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opment. For example, in Beijing case, the efficiency in operation budget is based on a better 
performance of the operation system. It is same to the future “Rail + Property” implemen-
tation, since land development is the ideal revenue source of the government, the implemen-
tation should create access to diverse land property development.
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